By Ramen Simon, Ihab Salman, and Kurdo Jamal
BAGHDAD/DAMASCUS/ERBIL/WASHINGTON (Hatha Al-Youm) – In one of the most complex and dangerous geopolitical shifts since 2011, the "Fertile Crescent" region is witnessing a radical reshaping of power and influence equations, following what appeared to be a targeting of the Kurdish "Autonomous Administration" project in Syria within less than 48 hours.
This rapid and unpredictable development comes in tandem with US forces beginning a tactical withdrawal from their bases in western Iraq. Deep intelligence readings reveal the precise execution of what was known in inner circles as "Plan B," a tight strategy engineered by Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa, casting its direct and dangerous repercussions on Iraqi national security, amidst rising alarming indicators about the potential replication of the 2014 border collapse scenario.
Details of the "East Euphrates" Deal
The accelerated developments witnessed over the past hours have led to a radical change in the military control map in Syria, as the central government in Damascus extended its full control over Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor provinces, thereby ending the era of "federalism" that lasted for years. According to field sources and matching reports, this shift was not born of military coincidence, but the product of a complex political-security deal.
Dismantling SDF and Receiving Resources
Field information indicates that Syrian Army units, supported by central "Internal Security" forces, officially received the management of major oil fields (Al-Omar and Al-Tanak) and "Conoco" gas plants in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor. The handover process proceeded with suspicious smoothness, as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) withdrew from their fortified positions, leaving behind heavy weapons and communication equipment, in implementation of the agreement terms brokered by US Envoy Thomas Brack.
The agreement, the terms of which were viewed by "Haza Al-Youm" and private sources, stipulates the complete dissolution of the SDF's military structure, and the integration of fighters wishing to continue as individuals (not as units) within the Fifth Corps of the Syrian Army and the Ministry of Interior, with the condition of "security vetting" for each element, and the expulsion of leaders linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) outside Syrian territory.
The Turkish Role and Announcement of "Victory"
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan did not delay in capitalizing on the event, considering in official statements that "the phase of terrorism on the southern borders has ended." The Turkish stance reflects high-level coordination with al-Sharaa's government; Ankara secured through this agreement the removal of the "Kurdish threat" without the need to launch a costly ground operation, settling for Damascus's guarantees to control the borders and prevent any PKK activity originating from Syrian territory.
Engineering the Strategic Coup
Intelligence documents and informed sources reveal that what is happening today is the practical application of a long-term strategy devised by Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly known as al-Jolani) years ago, known in narrow circles as "Plan B."
Al-Sharaa's strategy relied on the principle of "functional phasing." In the first phase (the phase of toppling the former regime), al-Sharaa showed high tactical flexibility toward the Kurdish component, offering vague promises regarding decentralization and cultural rights to ensure the neutralization of the eastern front. However, "Plan B" dictated that once central power was assumed in Damascus and international legitimacy obtained, a coup against these understandings would occur to restore "absolute sovereignty," which is exactly what happened. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi signed the agreement reluctantly over the phone. Al-Sharaa is scheduled to meet Abdi later on Monday.
Al-Sharaa exploited the "surplus of power" he now possesses (the factional army, air cover, and regional support from Turkey and Saudi Arabia) to impose his conditions on Kurdish fighters who found themselves trapped between the "hammer" of the Syrian Army and the "anvil" of the Turkish threat, with a total absence of US backing.
The "Thomas Brack" Doctrine and Withdrawal from Iraq
The Kurdish collapse in Syria cannot be separated from suspicious US movements in Iraq, specifically at "Ain al-Asad" base. Strategic analysts link the two events via the axis of a "shift in security doctrine" of the Trump administration.
Economic Trap and the Tribal Trojan Horse
Military force was not the only factor deciding the battle; "Plan B" relied on two soft pillars that paved the way for the Syrian Army's entry without significant resistance:
Economic reports monitored an immediate and dramatic improvement in the exchange rate of the Syrian Lira, which jumped to record levels (between 11,000 to 12,000 Lira per Dollar) immediately upon announcing control over oil fields in Deir ez-Zor. This rapid improvement, accompanied by promises to end the electricity and fuel crisis, granted al-Sharaa's government immediate "legitimacy of achievement" among the exhausted popular base, making broad segments of the population accept the return of centralization as an economic lifeline, pulling the rug out from under the Autonomous Administration which was already suffering from living crises.
Trojan Horse
Intelligence information indicates that the rapid collapse of SDF defense lines was not solely due to Damascus's military superiority, but the result of "secret tribal agreements" al-Sharaa concluded beforehand with influential tribal notables in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa (specifically the Al-Uqaydat and Al-Baggara tribes). These tribes acted as a "Trojan horse" from within; their sons refused to fight in SDF ranks at the moment of attack, and some tribes even facilitated the entry of Syrian Army units and secured roads for them, in revenge for marginalization policies previously practiced by Kurdish leaderships, leaving the defending forces with an exposed back and without a social incubator.
From "Proxy War" to "Alliance of States"
The current US Envoy, Thomas Brack, represents a new current in the Pentagon and State Department that believes the time of relying on "Non-State Actors" like the SDF has passed. The new doctrine, promoted by Brack and Admiral Brad Cooper, posits that US interests are better and more cheaply achieved through direct dealing with strong central governments in Damascus and Baghdad, capable of controlling internal security without the need for direct US military deployment.
Evacuation of "Ain al-Asad".. The Message and the Goal
Iraqi and Western military sources confirm that US forces have begun operations to evacuate sensitive equipment and surveillance systems from "Ain al-Asad" base in Anbar. This tactical withdrawal carries two dangerous indications:
First Indication: Lifting US cover from western Iraq and eastern Syria, leaving a security vacuum that Damascus rushed to fill, while Baghdad remains in a state of confusion.
Second Indication: Giving an implicit green light to regional powers (Turkey and Syria) to arrange the region's cards according to their interests, which explains the absolute US silence regarding the Syrian Army's entry into areas of former US influence.
Iraqi National Security.. The Existential Threat
Iraq represents the party most affected by these transformations, finding itself facing a "perfect storm" of security threats recalling the atmosphere of 2014.
The "Nineveh Gap" and Porous Borders
Iraqi intelligence reports from the Ministry of Defense and the National Security Advisors state that the border strip adjacent to Nineveh province (Mosul), specifically the areas of "Ba'aj" and "Rabia" reaching up to "Faysh Khabur," is considered the weakest link in the Iraqi defense system. Concerns focus on:
Infiltration of ISIS remnants: The chaos accompanying the handover process on the Syrian side may push hundreds of terrorist elements to infiltrate toward the western Iraqi desert and Wadi Hauran.
Armed Displacement: The possibility of PKK elements and their families fleeing Syria toward the Qandil and Sinjar mountains through Iraqi territory, which may necessitate a Turkish military intervention breaching Iraqi sovereignty to pursue them.
The Time Bomb of Prisons (The File of 9,000 Terrorists)
The prison file in northeastern Syria (Ghwayran, Al-Shaddadi, and Al-Hol camp) constitutes the biggest nightmare for Baghdad. These facilities hold nearly 9,000 fighters from the Islamic State organization, including dangerous leaders from the "first line," according to security sources.
The Enigma of Israeli Silence.. Tacit Approval
In another corner of the regional scene, an absolute and suspicious silence prevails in Tel Aviv regarding the Syrian Army's return to the eastern borders. Analysts read this silence as an undeclared Israeli "green light." In pragmatic Israeli calculations, the existence of a strong "central dictator" (like al-Sharaa) who controls borders and prevents chaos is far better than the continuation of a "decentralized" state that might allow the expansion of Iranian militias or the emergence of uncontrolled tension hotspots. Al-Sharaa attempts to demonize the SDF, saying they harbor "remnants of the defunct regime" and thus those who support them, i.e., Tehran. In other words, al-Sharaa tries to market that Iran is establishing a foothold in northeastern Syria, but he turns a blind eye to the Turkish presence.
It seems Tel Aviv has received guarantees (via the US channel) that "New Syria" will be occupied with reconstruction and consolidating internal rule, and will not be a platform to threaten Israel, which explains the lack of objection by the Israeli Air Force to the movement of massive Syrian Army convoys eastward.
Arab Media Cover.. End of the "Kurdish Exception"
Perhaps the most dangerous thing the Kurdish project faced in the past hours was not just weapons, but "Arab media isolation." Observers monitored a rare and stunning alignment in media discourse between usually competing poles (Qatar's Al Jazeera, and Saudi channels like Al Arabiya and Al Hadath). These platforms all agreed to frame the event as "restoring national sovereignty" and "returning wealth to the Syrian treasury," abandoning any previous tone of sympathy with the SDF. This media consensus reflects a unified political decision in Gulf capitals (Riyadh and Doha) to support stabilizing the pillars of al-Sharaa's rule, and lifting political cover from any federal project, stripping the Kurdish leadership of any Arab backing and transforming it in the eyes of Arab public opinion from a "partner in fighting terrorism" to a "separatist movement" that must be contained.
The "Breaking Walls" Scenario
There is genuine fear of collusion or deliberate negligence occurring during the transfer of control from the SDF to Syrian forces, which could lead to a mass escape of these individuals. Mr. Muqtada al-Sadr warned in his latest statement of a "plot" to smuggle them in coordination with external parties (referred to as "Baathists" in Jordan), calling for the immediate handover of Iraqi detainees.
Security experts evoke the "2014 complex" when reading the current scene. In 2014, government reports asserted borders were secure, before Mosul fell to a few hundred gunmen coming from Syria. Today, the same objective circumstances repeat: US withdrawal, disintegration of a border force (SDF), and confusion in command and control, making the infiltration scenario highly probable, especially given the weak intelligence effort in desert areas.
The Golden Prison Card
Behind the declared military scenes, there are extremely dangerous strategic data regarding the detainees' file, pointing to deeper dimensions of the crisis.
"Blank Check" for al-Sharaa
Observers believe that al-Sharaa's anticipated control over ISIS prisons in Hasakah and Deir ez-Zor, without fighting, will present him with a "pressure card on a silver platter" facing the international community. By possessing the keys to the cells of the world's most dangerous terrorists, al-Sharaa transforms from a "transitional leader" to an indispensable security partner for the West. These prisons will be a "winning card" with which he blackmails European capitals and even Baghdad, whether to demand full legitimacy recognition for his government, or to impose negotiation terms regarding the file of repatriating foreign fighters, making him the sole controller of the "safety valve" the West fears.
In a scene reinforcing the hypothesis of "betrayal" that stabbed the SDF from within, a stark and suspicious contradiction prevails between field reality and media discourse. While vital areas are being handed over to the Syrian Army based on high-command agreements, the "Autonomous Administration" still issues, up to the moment of writing this report, enthusiastic statements calling on residents for "general mobilization" and urging them to bear arms to confront the "advance of the Damascus government."
This schizophrenia confirms a deep rift; either the military leadership (Mazloum Abdi) has concluded a secret deal in isolation from the political wing, or there is a deliberate deception operation to leave popular bases facing their fate, facilitating the rapid collapse process and preventing the formation of any organized resistance against the "inghimasi" forces coming from Damascus.
Paradox of Sunni and Shia Stances on Federalism
The regional scene reveals a "stark contradiction" in the general Arab Sunni mood, governed by the identity of the "Ruler" in the central capital. Kurdish and Iraqi analysts note that the Arab Sunni incubator that historically supported (or sympathized with) the Kurdistan Region of Iraq's ambitions to separate from Baghdad, stemming from its rejection of "Shia majority" rule, is the very same that today fiercely rejects any form of federalism in Syria, and applauds the centralization of the "Sunni" Ahmed al-Sharaa.
This duality confirms that rejection or acceptance is not based on the principle of "peoples' rights" or "state form," but on the "sectarian identity of the holder of power." Kurdish analysts go so far as to say that Iraq's Sunnis who today fear "chaos" in Syria, dream in their heart of hearts of the emergence of an "Iraqi Sharaa" (a strong Sunni ruler) who re-imposes centralization on Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, just as his Syrian counterpart did in Raqqa and Hasakah, making Kurdish anxieties in Iraq existential and not merely fleeting security fears.
On the other side, the Shia political stance (especially active forces in Baghdad) does not seem less contradictory. While these circles show sympathy and political support for Kurdish ambitions in Syria to maintain their "Autonomous Administration" out of spite against the new central Sunni rule led by al-Sharaa (aiming to weaken him and prevent him from gaining strength), they practice the utmost degrees of suffocating centralization against the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
This Machiavellian paradox manifests in that Baghdad, which might shed tears over the loss of Kurdish rights in Qamishli, is the very same utilizing the "weapon of salaries," budget, and Federal Court decisions to undermine the constitutional entity of the Kurdistan Region, seeking to transform it into mere provinces administratively and financially subordinate to Baghdad. This contradiction proves that "federalism" in regional political custom is not a constitutional principle for managing diversity, but a "functional tactic"; supported to weaken an opponent (as Shias want for Syria's Sharaa), and fought to bring a partner to their knees. The final result is that Kurds on both sides of the border pay the tax of this double hypocrisy: slaughtered by the knife of Sunni centralization in Syria, and besieged by the whip of Shia centralization in Iraq.
The Timeline of Events
This precise timeline monitors the sequence of events over the past 72 hours, which led to the current scene:
Jan 16, 2026 (Friday Evening): Secret meeting in a US base in Hasakah involving Thomas Brack (US Envoy), Mazloum Abdi (SDF Commander), and delegates of Ahmed al-Sharaa. In this meeting, Brack informed the Kurds of the decision to "lift the cover" and the necessity to accept Damascus's terms.
Jan 17, 2026 (Saturday Morning): President Ahmed al-Sharaa issued a presidential decree granting "cultural rights" to Kurds as a preliminary goodwill gesture, followed by the commencement of massive Syrian Army buildup on the outskirts of "Tabqa."
Jan 17, 2026 (Saturday Noon): Collapse of side negotiations and attempted resistance by some SDF factions, leading to limited skirmishes that quickly ceased after a US threat to cut immediate supply.
Jan 18, 2026 (Sunday Morning): Signing of the "Integration Agreement" officially in Damascus without Abdi attending, but via phone as stated by al-Sharaa in a press statement. The 14 terms of the agreement included handing over heavy weapons, crossings, and oil.
Jan 18, 2026 (Sunday Afternoon): SDF withdrawal from Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor countryside begins. Documentation of the first Syrian forces entering Al-Omar oil field.
Jan 18, 2026 (Sunday Evening): Heavy air traffic and transport of equipment monitored from "Ain al-Asad" base in Iraq towards Jordan, indicating the start of US evacuation.
Jan 19, 2026 (Monday Morning - Today): Turkish President announces "end of the era of terror." Syrian Army raises the flag in Raqqa's main square.
Jan 19, 2026 (Monday Noon): Iraqi Ministry of Defense announces "Alert C" on the northwestern borders and dispatches the 9th Armored Brigade to reinforce the Mosul-Rabia sector.
Jan 19, 2026 (Monday Afternoon): Issuance of Sadr's statement warning of "vagabonds" and demanding the immediate handover of Iraqi detainees.
Jan 19, 2026 (Monday Evening): Reports of mysterious clashes in the vicinity of "Al-Shaddadi" prison amidst unconfirmed news of the escape of a number of prisoners, and mutual accusations between SDF and Damascus regarding responsibility.
Expected Scenarios
Based on the above data, the scene is heading toward one of the following scenarios:
First Scenario (Successful Containment): Success of the Syrian Army in rapidly controlling security in the new areas, and high security coordination between Baghdad and Damascus to seal the borders, ending the threat of ISIS and opening the overland trade route between Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.
Second Scenario (Creative Chaos): Failure of the rapid integration process of SDF forces, and occurrence of internal mutinies, creating a security vacuum exploited by ISIS to launch coordinated attacks on the Iraqi border and storm prisons, which is the "nightmare" scenario for Baghdad and even Damascus.
Third Scenario (Regional Clash): Turkish ground intervention to pursue PKK elements fleeing toward Iraq, leading to a clash with Iraqi forces or the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), turning western Iraq and its north into an open regional war zone.
Officials fear that Iraq will be alone facing the consequences of this collapse, amidst demands for urgent sovereign decisions that go beyond "media assurances" to reach the level of actual combat readiness on the ground, especially since recent history has proven that fire in Syria quickly burns the fingers of neighbors.
