Shafaq News

When Devlet Bahceli, the leader ofthe Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), proposed in October 2024 that AbdullahOcalan could address Turkish parliament if he called for the dissolution of theKurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the statement reverberated across Ankara'spolitical landscape.

For decades, Bahceli had beenassociated with one of the country's most uncompromising nationalisttraditions. Yet his proposal was followed by a series of developments fewobservers could have imagined only months earlier. In February 2025, Ocalancalled on the PKK to convene a congress and consider ending its armed struggle. In May of the same year, the organization revealed that it would dissolve itsorganizational structure and pursue its objectives through political anddemocratic means.

The discussions that followedquickly moved beyond whether dialogue was possible and toward a more difficultchallenge: what political framework could govern relations between the Turkishstate and millions of Kurdish citizens if armed conflict ceased to be thedominant reality? Nearly a century after the founding of the republic, theKurdish issue remains intertwined with questions of identity, citizenship,security, democracy, local governance, and political representation.

: From dialogue to drone strikes: PKK-Turkiye conflict after Öcalan initiative

Power in Numbers

The Kurds are the largest ethnicminority in Turkiye, but their true numbers remain open to debate. With thestate collecting no ethnic data through its census, estimates are drawn insteadfrom surveys, polling, and demographic research.

Most place the Kurdish populationbetween 15 and 20 million, or roughly 15 to 20% of the country's population. A2024 survey by the Turkish research company KONDA put the figure at around 18%,reflecting the scale of a community that has shaped Turkiye's social andpolitical life for generations.

For decades, the center of Kurdishlife lay in the country's east and southeast. Provinces such as Diyarbakır,Van, Hakkari, Batman, Mardin, and Siirt served as the main strongholds ofKurdish language, culture, and political activity.

Today, that geography tells onlypart of the story.

Over the past several decades,economic migration, rapid urbanization, and years of conflict have redrawn theKurdish map of Turkiye. Millions left their hometowns, heading west toward thecountry's economic centers. Kurdish communities are now deeply woven into thefabric of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, and Mersin. The shift has beenso profound that some scholars, including sociologist Mesut Yegen, argue thatIstanbul has become home to the largest Kurdish population of any city in theworld.

"The movement of Kurdishcommunities into Turkiye's largest cities blurred the old distinction betweenthe Kurdish-majority southeast and the rest of the country, bringing Kurdishpolitics into the center of national life," Yegen wrote. Elections inmajor metropolitan areas, he argued, can no longer be understood withoutaccounting for Kurdish voters, whose support has often proved decisive intightly contested races.

Yet despite their growing electoralweight, Kurds do not enjoy a formal share of power within the state. Unlikecountries such as Iraq, where parliamentary seats and senior positions aredistributed along communal lines, Turkiye has no system of ethnic quotas. Representation in the 600-seat parliament, the cabinet, the judiciary, thecivil service, and the armed forces is not allocated according to ethnicity.

Instead, Kurdish participation hasemerged through the same institutions and political channels available to othercitizens. Kurdish politicians have entered parliament through Kurdish-orientedparties, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the RepublicanPeople's Party (CHP), and nationalist parties. Kurdish-origin figures have alsooccupied senior state positions, with former Turkish President Turgut Özal,widely regarded as having Kurdish roots.

: Coexistence by design: Iran's Kurds straddle the line between inclusion and autonomy

The Threshold Breach

For much of the republic's history,Kurdish political activism was associated with protest movements, securityconcerns, or armed conflict. Over the past three decades, however, anincreasingly important arena has emerged inside parliament, municipal councils,and ballot boxes.

That shift did not happen smoothly. Kurdish-oriented parties faced repeated closures, legal challenges, andpolitical pressure, yet they continued to reappear under new names andorganizational structures. The political lineage stretching from the People'sLabor Party (HEP) and the Democracy Party (DEP) to the People's Democracy Party(HADEP), the Democratic Society Party (DTP), the Peoples' Democratic Party(HDP), and today's Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) reflects along-running effort to pursue Kurdish demands through democratic institutions.

The movement's modern politicalroots date back to 1990, when HEP emerged as the first major pro-Kurdish partyin contemporary Turkish politics. After its dissolution, a succession ofparties —including DEP, HADEP, the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP), DTP, andthe Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)— carried the movement forward. While theirpriorities evolved over time, most advocated greater cultural rights, strongerlocal governance, and broader democratic reforms.

One major obstacle was Turkiye's 10%electoral threshold, among the highest in the world. The barrier made itdifficult for smaller parties to enter parliament, prompting many Kurdishpoliticians to run as independents before later forming parliamentary blocs.

Despite that challenge,Kurdish-oriented parties built strong support networks, won municipalitiesacross the southeast, and maintained a presence in national politics. Theturning point came in June 2015.

HDP captured about 13.1% of the voteand won 80 seats in parliament, becoming the first Kurdish-led politicalmovement to cross the electoral threshold as a party. The result denied theruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) a parliamentary majority anddemonstrated that Kurdish-oriented politics could influence national outcomesbeyond Kurdish-majority regions.

For supporters, the election markedthe culmination of decades of political participation and underscored thegrowing electoral weight of Kurdish voters.

Although the HDP later faced legalchallenges, investigations, and the detention of its prominent figures, itremained a significant force in parliament. Ahead of the 2023 elections, manyof its candidates ran under the Green Left Party banner before reorganizingunder the DEM Party, now the principal vehicle for pro-Kurdish politics at thenational level.

The importance of Kurdish politicalparticipation extends beyond Ankara. Municipal politics have become equallycentral to the debate. Cities such as Diyarbakir, Van, and Batman emerged asstrongholds of Kurdish political representation, allowing local leaders togovern through elected institutions.

Yet it is at the municipal levelthat some of the sharpest disputes have unfolded.

Following terrorism-relatedinvestigations, Turkish authorities removed numerous elected mayors andappointed trustees to administer municipalities, maintaining that localgovernments must operate within the framework of national law and securityrequirements.

Kurdish politicians viewed theremovals differently, arguing that replacing elected officials weakeneddemocratic representation and disregarded the will of voters. DEM Partyco-chairs Tuncer Bakırhan and Tülay Hatimoğulları have repeatedly contended thata lasting solution requires ‘’deeper democratic reforms and broader politicalparticipation.’’ Ankara, meanwhile, continues to stress national unity,security, and constitutional order.

: Turkiye’s cautious gamble: PKK disarmament and the regional chessboard

Identity Reclaimed

Today, Kurdish politics is deeplywoven into Turkiye's national political landscape. That was not always thecase.

The relationship between the Turkishstate and its Kurdish population has undergone profound changes since thefounding of the republic. The roots of the modern Kurdish movement can betraced to the nation-building project that followed the collapse of the OttomanEmpire and the establishment of the Republic of Turkiye in 1923 under theleadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The new state sought to forge aunified national identity after years of war, territorial losses, and politicalupheaval. In that environment, public expressions of Kurdish identity wereoften viewed through the prism of national unity and state consolidation.

For much of the twentieth century,Kurdish identity received little official recognition. Restrictions on thepublic use of the Kurdish language appeared at different periods, and the stategenerally avoided acknowledging a distinct Kurdish political reality.

The issue remained politicallysensitive for decades.

A major shift began in the early2000s as Turkiye pursued reforms linked to its European Union accessionprocess. Restrictions on Kurdish-language broadcasting were eased,Kurdish-language courses became possible under certain conditions, and publicdiscussion of Kurdish identity expanded.

A symbolic turning point came inAugust 2005 when then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan delivered a speech inDiyarbakir. "The Kurdish issue is everyone's issue," he remarked,acknowledging a reality that previous governments had often avoided discussingopenly.

Supporters viewed the speech as ahistoric departure from earlier policies. Critics argued that recognition alonewould not address deeper political grievances. Yet few questioned itssignificance.

The launch of TRT Kurdi in 2009provided another visible sign of change. A state-run Kurdish-languagebroadcaster would have been difficult to imagine during earlier decades.

These reforms altered the nature ofthe debate. As historian Nicole F. Watts has previously observed, discussionsshifted from whether Kurdish identity should be recognized to how Kurdishcitizens should participate in political life and how the state should respondto demands related to representation, local governance, and political rights.

The PKK Changed Everything

While political and cultural reformsgradually expanded space for Kurdish identity in Turkiye, no developmentreshaped the Kurdish issue more profoundly than the emergence of the PKK.Founded in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan and a circle of Kurdish leftist activists,the group shifted into armed insurgency in 1984 against the Turkish state. Whatfollowed became one of the longest-running conflicts in the modern Middle East.

Turkish authorities, including theMinistry of Interior and the Turkish Armed Forces, have long placed the deathtoll at more than 50,000, covering security personnel, PKK militants, andcivilians together. The conflict also carried a heavy demographic impact. Entire villages in southeastern Turkiye were emptied during counterinsurgencyoperations, a reality documented by Human Rights Watch, which suggested thatmore than 500,000 people were forced to leave their homes, relocating towardmajor cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir.

From Ankara’s perspective, theframing has remained consistent. The PKK is designated a terrorist organizationby Turkiye, the United States, and the European Union. Successive governmentshave consistently treated military operations as necessary measures to protectterritorial integrity and civilian safety. President Erdogan has repeatedlyreinforced this stance, stating that Turkiye would “continue its fight againstterrorism until the last terrorist is eliminated.”

The Kurdish political reading of theconflict moves in a different direction. Figures within the DEM Party and itspredecessor, the HDP, argue that the roots of the violence lie not only inarmed mobilization but also in decades of restrictions on language rights,political participation, and cultural expression.

Former HDP co-chair SelahattinDemirtaş captured this perspective, arguing that “peace in this country willnot come through weapons, but through equal citizenship and democraticpolitics.” Current DEM Party representatives continue to maintain that the Kurdishissue cannot be reduced to security terminology alone, urging dialogue anddemocratic reform as the foundation for any durable settlement.

At the center of this landscapestands PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. Captured in 1999 in Nairobi, Kenya, he wassentenced to life imprisonment and transferred to Imrali Island, where he hasremained ever since. His presence, however, has never fully faded, with hismessages continuing to circulate through Kurdish political channels asinfluential interventions rather than historical remnants.

His role became especially visibleduring the 2013–2015 peace process. In March 2013, during Newroz celebrationsin Diyarbakir, a message attributed to Ocalan called for an end to armedstruggle. “Let guns be silent, and politics speak,” the message declared, whilealso framing the moment as a “historical responsibility.” For a brief period,the atmosphere shifted enough to suggest that a negotiated path might open.

That opening, however, remainedfragile. Erdogan warned that the process would only continue if armed groupswithdrew completely, stating that “we will not negotiate with those who holdweapons in their hands.”

Within Kurdish political circles,expectations remained cautious but oriented toward negotiation. Then-HDPco-chair Figen Yuksekdag argued that trust required more than politicalmessaging, maintaining that “mutual confidence cannot be built while one sidespeaks of peace and the other maintains military pressure.”

By 2015, the process collapsed. Violence resumed, and both sides exchanged blame over stalled commitments. Erdogan maintained that the PKK had not fully laid down arms, while Kurdishpolitical actors argued that the political framework necessary to sustaindialogue had been allowed to fall apart.

Peace by Piece

The developments of 2024 and 2025brought these longstanding questions back into focus. Nearly a decade after thecollapse of the peace process, discussions surrounding Ocalan re-emergedunexpectedly. Bahceli's proposal, Ocalan's subsequent call for the PKK to endits armed struggle, and the organization's move to dissolve its structurecreated a new political environment.

Whether these developmentsultimately produce lasting change remains uncertain. History offers amplereasons for caution. Previous initiatives generated optimism before collapsingamid renewed tensions and violence.

Yet the current moment differs fromearlier periods in important ways.

Kurdish politics is moreinstitutionalized than it was in the 1990s. Municipal governance plays a largerrole. Electoral participation is deeply entrenched. The DEM Party has emergedas a significant parliamentary actor rather than a marginal political force.

As a result, today's debate extendsway beyond just an armed conflict.

Written and edited by Shafaq Newsstaff.