Analysis: Turkey emerges unscathed from the Iran war
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Ragip Soylu
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Wed, 06/17/2026 - 15:30
Despite missile threats and rising energy costs, Ankara emerged with stronger Nato ties, new Gulf defence deals and a role in US-Iran diplomacy
"Turks are now experts on turning regional crisis into opportunities for themselves," a European diplomat said (AFP)
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When US President Donald Trump ordered strikes on Iran in late February, Turkish officials found themselves sidelined.
Their repeated attempts to prevent the war proved unsuccessful, and the mood in Ankara was that Trump preferred the counsel of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over that of Turkish leaders.
Three months later, however, Trump once again counted Turkey, alongside Pakistan and Qatar, among the countries that had significantly helped secure a memorandum of understanding with Iran. He also adopted an increasingly combative tone towards Israel.
On Sunday, Tehran and Washington reached an agreement that would extend a fragile ceasefire between the two sides for 60 days and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran blocked when the US and Israel launched the war.
Turkish officials, speaking to Middle East Eye this week, cautioned that the memorandum of understanding was only a first step toward resolving the US-Iran dispute and would do little more than ease pressure on the Strait of Hormuz.
“The 60-day window to negotiate a final deal on the nuclear file and other side issues will be more complex and more challenging than anything else,” one Turkish official said.
“This will be the real test of whether this calm can last.”
Many experts in Ankara worry that Israel may take steps in the coming months to upend the deal. Yet one thing is clear: Turkey has largely emerged unscathed from the Iran war.
The Kurdish threat
When the war on Iran began, Ankara had serious concerns about the future and stability of the Iranian government, but its worst fears didn't materialise.
First, Turkish officials activated contingency plans along the eastern border with Iran to prevent a possible wave of refugees from entering the country. Secondly, Israeli officials had been pushing plans to use Iranian Kurds to spearhead an insurgency in western Iran.
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Ankara was worried that the use of Kurdish groups could affect its own peace talks with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and push Turkey into a Syria-like scenario, in which Kurds based near its border took control of territory and posed a security challenge.
As Israeli and US attacks on Iranian targets intensified, so too did rhetoric from within Netanyahu's cabinet that "Turkey is next after Iran", heightening concerns in Ankara about the potential spillover effects of a collapse in Iranian state authority.
Despite these concerns, Ankara succeeded in keeping the border quiet and had enough political capital and influence to convince Trump that a Kurdish insurgency was not a good idea.
Divisions within the Iraqi Kurdistan region over what to do about Iranian Kurds, including disagreements between the ruling Barzani and Talabani families, and the fact that relatively few Kurds would be equipped with the necessary arms to lead such an effort greatly helped the Turkish case.
CIA Director John Ratcliffe and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also had deep doubts about the validity of the plan.
Arms contracts
One unexpected development was that Iran fired four ballistic missiles into Turkey. The attack came alongside Iranian strikes on Gulf and other regional countries hosting US forces, and may have targeted Incirlik Air Base, which is used by US forces, as well as Kurecik Radar Base, a key installation used to track Iranian ballistic missile launches.
The missiles infuriated Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who, in several angry conversations with Tehran, made clear that Ankara would not tolerate such attacks, especially if they hit a populated area.
Many Ankara insiders at the time expected that if Iranian missiles landed in a civilian area and caused casualties, Turkey would have been compelled to retaliate, potentially triggering a dangerous cycle of escalation.
By keeping the attacks sporadic and focused on installations hosting US assets, Iran managed to preserve calm with Turkey.
Ironically, however, these attacks strengthened Ankara’s standing within the Nato alliance. The US government, as well as Germany and Italy, deployed several anti-ballistic missile systems to Turkey, stepping up to help an ally in need and allowing ties with these countries to warm further.
Moreover, Ankara emerged as an arms supplier to Gulf countries seeking large purchases of air defence systems in the face of Iranian long-range drone attacks.
Ankara signed contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars with countries such as Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, positioning itself as a reliable arms supplier.
Although Ankara still lacks long-range anti-ballistic interceptor capabilities, it has an active programme to build that infrastructure and has raised the possibility of joint investment, which Gulf states are increasingly interested in.
While Turkey was signing these deals with the Gulf, it also managed to maintain its relationship with Iran, which proved very useful during ceasefire negotiations.
Opportunism
The Iranian strikes have shattered the perception that the Gulf monarchies and their gleaming financial centres are untouchable, encouraging Ankara to position itself as an alternative investment hub.
This is a difficult bet, requiring extensive legal reforms and long-term infrastructure investment. Still, the war has helped Turkey’s standing as a safe haven away from Iranian attacks.
The war, on the other hand, also complicated Turkey’s fight against inflation. An energy research think tank estimates that rising energy prices resulting from the disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz would add nearly $14bn to Turkey’s energy bill.
The inflationary impact was already evident in April and May data, though the government was able to manage the ramifications.
But beyond that, Ankara also tried to take advantage of the energy crisis by proposing several energy and connectivity routes that leveraged its unique position, from reviving the Hejaz Railway to extending the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline to Basra and building a gas pipeline between Qatar and Turkey.
Lastly, recent independent polls viewed by Middle East Eye indicate that the war had a rally-around-the-flag effect in Turkey, boosting Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s popularity despite his recent crackdown on the main opposition party.
"Turks are now experts on turning regional crisis into opportunities for themselves," a European diplomat said.
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