Shafaq News
The Peshmergaoccupied a unique place in the Kurdistan Region's political consciousness longbefore becoming part of Iraq’s federal framework after 2005. For the vastmajority of Kurds, the force represents far more than a military institution. Its name, commonly translated as “those who face death”, emerged from decadesof struggle between the Kurdish national movement and central governments inIraq and the wider region.
Today, thathistorical legacy stands at the center of a growing political dispute. As Iraqrevisits the issue of restricting weapons to state control, concerns havesurfaced over whether the Peshmerga should also fall within the scope of thosediscussions. The debate has exposed deeper disagreements over federalism,constitutional authority, and the balance of power between Baghdad and Erbil.
A Force Rootedin History
The origins ofthe modern Peshmerga trace back to the early twentieth century, before takingshape as a more organized force through successive Kurdish uprisings andpolitical movements that intensified during the 1950s and 1960s.
Following theKurdish uprising of 1991 and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, thePeshmerga gradually evolved into the Kurdistan Region’s official securityinstitution. Their position gained further recognition with the adoption ofIraq’s Constitution in 2005, which established a broader frameworkacknowledging the Region and its governing institutions, including its securityapparatus.
For thisreason, Kurdish leaders maintain that the Peshmerga cannot be treated as amilitary force subject to political bargaining. In Kurdish collective memory,the force embodies experiences ranging from the Anfal genocide, chemicalattacks, displacement, and internal conflicts to the fight against ISIS, whenlarge sections of Iraq’s defense lines collapsed while the Kurdistan Regionremained largely under the protection of its own forces.
That symbolismfeatured prominently in recent remarks by the head of the Kurdistan DemocraticParty (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani. Widely regarded by many Kurds as acontinuation of the Peshmerga’s political and military legacy, Barzaniportrayed the force’s weapons as more than a conventional arsenal, underscoringtheir role as a symbol of sacrifice, dignity, and historical securityguarantees.
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How thePeshmerga Entered the Disarmament Discussion?
The backdrop tothe current controversy lies in renewed efforts to address the issue of weaponsoutside direct state control. The debate returned to the forefront as theUnited States and regional actors intensified pressure on Shiite armed factionsallied with Iran.
Initiallycentered on the future of groups operating beyond state institutions, thediscussion gradually expanded in some political circles to encompass theposition of the Peshmerga.
Politicalfigures in Iraq have circulated reports of a proposal attributed to TomBarrack, the US ambassador to Turkiye and presidential envoy for Iraq andSyria, suggesting that all armed formations, including certain Shiite factionsand the Peshmerga, should be brought under the umbrella of Iraq’s armed forcesand the authority of Baghdad. The proposal, however, has yet to emerge as anofficially declared US position.
Nevertheless,the concept gained traction in domestic political discussions. According toofficial statements and experts interviewed by Shafaq News, some Shiitefactions opposed to disarmament, or reluctant to place their militarycapabilities entirely under Baghdad’s control, have sought to include thePeshmerga in the same framework.
Their argumentcenters on a seemingly straightforward question: if all weapons are to beplaced under state authority, why should the Kurdistan Region’s forces beexempt?
Kurdishofficials, legal specialists, and security experts reject that comparison. Theyargue that it overlooks the distinction between a regional force whoselegitimacy derives from constitutional provisions within a federal system andarmed factions that emerged or expanded under exceptional political andsecurity circumstances after 2003 and during the campaign against ISIS. Many ofthose groups, they note, continue to face scrutiny regarding politicalloyalties, military chains of command, and links to regional conflictsextending beyond Iraq’s official decision-making structures.
Statementsissued by some factions have reinforced perceptions that efforts are underwayto shift the debate from the dilemma of armed groups to a broader comparisoninvolving both the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the Peshmerga.
Nazem Al-Saidi,head of the executive council of the US-sanctioned Harakat Al-Nujaba, toldShafaq News that the Iraqi “resistance” does not impose red lines regardingdiscussions on surrendering weapons. He nonetheless tied any such process tothe withdrawal of foreign military bases from Iraq, an end to “financial andeconomic dependency, and distancing the country from political decisionsdictated by the US Embassy.”
Al-Saidifurther stated that factions which had relinquished their weapons may havechosen to move from the “resistance project” toward participation in thepolitical process, stressing that Harakat Al-Nujaba believes weapons should notbe surrendered “except to Imam Mahdi,”* given what he characterized as thedangers and challenges surrounding Iraq.
He alsoquestioned why pressure remains concentrated on factional and PMF weaponswhile, in his view, no equivalent attention is directed toward “the weapons ofextremist groups or the Peshmerga forces.”
Kurdistan’sConstitutional Position
For Kurdishofficials, this is precisely where the Peshmerga became part of a debate notinitiated by Erbil. They interpret references to the force as an attempt eitherto broaden the discussion or to portray American and governmental pressure asselective. In Erbil’s view, the comparison deliberately conflates twofundamentally different issues in law, politics, and history.
Security expertJabar Yawar, a former senior official in the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs anda prominent observer of security relations between Baghdad and Erbil, dismisseddiscussions about dissolving or disarming the Peshmerga as lacking any legal orpractical basis.
Speaking toShafaq News, Yawar stated that neither Iraqi nor international officials haveissued formal or informal calls for such measures, emphasizing that currentdiscussions focus on specific factions, including Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, KataibHezbollah Iraq, Harakat Al-Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, and Kataib ImamAli— not the Peshmerga.
Yawar pointedto Article 121 of the Iraqi Constitution, which grants regions the right toestablish and organize internal security forces, including police, securityservices, and regional guards. On that basis, he argued that the Peshmergaconstitute the Kurdistan Region Guard, operating within a constitutionalframework rather than outside state authority.
Consequently,any attempt to alter the force’s status could not be accomplished throughpolitical agreements, external pressure, or arrangements between Baghdad andarmed factions. Such a move, according to this interpretation, would require acomplex constitutional and legislative process because the Peshmerga are notgoverned by an ordinary federal law that can be amended in the same manner aslegislation regulating other formations.
At thelegislative level, Iraqi lawmaker Sarwa Mohammed likewise asserted that anyeffort to dissolve the Peshmerga would violate the Constitution and contradictthe principles of Iraq’s federal system, which guarantees the Kurdistan Regionthe right to maintain its own security institutions.
She describedthe Peshmerga as a constitutional and professional force responsible forprotecting the Kurdistan Region’s borders, security, and stability, affirmingthat it should not be included in debates concerning weapons outside stateinstitutions.
“Confusing thePeshmerga with armed factions does not resolve the weapons issue,” Mohammedsaid, “It opens the door to a constitutional crisis between Baghdad and Erbil.”
At the sametime, she disclosed the existence of an initiative proposed by the State of LawCoalition, led by Nouri al-Maliki, aimed at addressing the status of certainarmed factions through integration into Iraq’s official military and securityinstitutions. Noting the ongoing discussions between the Iraqi government andseveral factions regarding mechanisms for surrendering weapons or incorporatingfighters into formal structures, she stressed concern that armed groupsoperating outside official institutions do not involve the Peshmerga.
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Washington’sPerspective
FromWashington, Kurdish affairs and US foreign policy researcher Delovan Barwarisaid the Peshmerga cannot be viewed as a temporary force or an armed groupestablished outside the state. Instead, he described it as a recognizedregional guard force fulfilling an acknowledged security role.
In remarks toShafaq News, Barwari characterized proposals advocating the dissolution of thePeshmerga as both unconstitutional and irrational because they conflict withthe constitutional framework through which Iraq recognized the Kurdistan Regionand its right to maintain regional security forces within a federal system.
He recalled theperiod following the fall of Saddam Hussein, when the Kurdistan Regionpreserved a degree of stability while much of Iraq experienced violence andinstitutional breakdown. Barwari also highlighted the Peshmerga’s role inconfronting extremist organizations ranging from Al-Qaeda to ISIS andcooperating with international coalition partners to safeguard Iraq and thebroader region.
Regarding theAmerican position, Barwari dismissed the notion that decision-makers inWashington are pursuing a serious effort to dismantle the Peshmerga.
“I do not seecredible evidence of a US effort in that direction,” he said, describing such proposalsas political messaging linked to internal Iraqi dynamics that tend to surfaceduring periods of tension between Baghdad and Erbil.
Similarassessments have come from American military figures who worked alongside thePeshmerga during the campaign against ISIS. Retired US Army Colonel MylesCaggins, former spokesman for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, went beyondrejecting calls to dissolve the force, portraying it as a valuable securitypartner whose capabilities should be strengthened rather than reduced.
Caggins, nowfounder & CEO of Words Warriors, a consulting and government relationsfirm, described the Peshmerga as “a long-standing security force fullyauthorized under the Iraqi Constitution.” He emphasized its role in maintaininginternal security in the Kurdistan Region and its record as a dependable USpartner during key military campaigns, from the period following SaddamHussein’s fall to the fight against ISIS.
He argued thatlocally established security forces recognized by the federal system reflectIraq’s geography, history, language, and social realities. Caggins also calledon the United States and allied countries to deepen cooperation with thePeshmerga and expand support in areas such as technology, training, andcounter-drone capabilities.
PoliticalBalancing or State Consolidation?
Lahib Higel,Senior Iraq Analyst at the International Crisis Group, rejected suggestionsthat Washington is actively pressing for the dissolution of the Peshmerga orits integration into federal forces. Instead, she viewed the discussion as adomestic political maneuver linked to Baghdad’s internal balance of power.
Speaking toShafaq News, Higel observed that the proposal may represent an attempt byfederal authorities to reassure Iran-aligned factions facing pressure overtheir weapons by presenting the issue as one affecting all forces operatingoutside Baghdad’s direct control.
She cautioned,however, that such an approach could have significant repercussions forrelations between Baghdad and Erbil while also intensifying divisions withinKurdish politics, particularly between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and thePatriotic Union of Kurdistan, given existing disputes over Peshmerga reform andunification.
That internaldimension introduces another layer of sensitivity. Some researchers contendthat divisions within the Peshmerga’s military structure provide politicalopponents in Baghdad with additional opportunities to use the issue asleverage.
Yasser Kuoti, aMiddle East analyst and doctoral student in political science at BostonUniversity, pointed to signs of a broader US inclination toward strengtheningthe authority of the federal government. At the same time, he stated that thePeshmerga’s organizational structure remains partially influenced by thehistoric division between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the PatrioticUnion of Kurdistan (PUK).
Although Erbiland its western partners have spent years pursuing reforms aimed at unifyingforces under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, Kuoti noted that “the issuecontinues to supply some actors with arguments for bringing the force underfederal authority.”
He alsosuggested that calls for integration may stem from pressure exerted by Iraqipolitical groups seeking a parallel arrangement. In that context, factionsfacing demands to submit to state authority may insist that any effort toregulate weapons should apply equally to all armed forces.
RegionalDynamics and the Weapons
Iraqi strategicaffairs researcher Kazem Yawar noted that restricting weapons to state controlremains one of the key objectives included in the government’s program. Whilethe issue is not new, he said, recent regional developments and the ongoingconfrontation involving the United States, Israel, and Iran have pushed it backto the forefront of political and media discourse.
According toYawar, Washington has publicly advocated implementation of the principle thatweapons should remain under state authority, prompting extensive discussionacross official, media, and public spheres. The issue has also attractedattention from both the United States and Gulf states because of concerns overarmed faction activity and its potential impact on American and Gulf interests.
Yawar notedthat the Kurdistan Parliament enacted the Ministry of Peshmerga Law No. 19 of2007, and provided a clear legal framework for the Region Guard. He alsocontrasted the Peshmerga’s legal status with that of the PMF. The PMF emergedunder exceptional circumstances and was later regulated through legislationadopted in 2016, a law that can be revised through federal constitutionalmechanisms. The Peshmerga, by contrast, derive their status from constitutionalprovisions and regional authorities, making dissolution or full integrationimpossible without constitutional amendments or legislation issued by theKurdistan Parliament.
Kurdish Syrianpolitical analyst Shvan Ibrahim remarked that attempts to include the Peshmergain disarmament initiatives reflect a perception among some actors of Kurds as apermanent adversary or threat to the state.
Speaking toShafaq News, Ibrahim described comparisons between the Peshmerga and factionsthat he said “spread corruption, destruction, and devastation in Iraq andneighboring countries” as historically and politically unjust.
“The Peshmergadid not threaten neighboring states, did not attack Gulf countries, and did notharm civilians or politicians,” he said, adding that “Instead, they protectedKurdistan and millions of displaced people and refugees, including Iraqi andSyrian Arabs who fled ISIS, armed factions, and militias.”
He furtherindicated that the Peshmerga protected Iraqi political leaders during the earlystages of the Iraqi Governing Council, the provisional government of Iraq from13 July 2003 to 1 June 2004, and parliament, contributed to the defense ofMosul and other areas, and played a major role in the war against ISIS. Anyeffort to dissolve the force, he warned, “would trigger one of Iraq’s mostserious national crises by reviving a centralized model of governance thatconcentrates power in federal institutions and risks reproducing authoritarianpractices.”
Ibrahim alsoaddressed comparisons with Syria, where debates continue over the futureintegration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into state institutions. Inhis view, “the parallel is flawed.” The SDF emerged during a civil war and amidthe collapse of central authority, whereas the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is aconstitutionally recognized federal entity with elected institutions, locallegislation, and security forces whose existence is explicitly protected underIraqi law.
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A Test ofIraq’s Post-2003 Order
The disputeover the Peshmerga’s place in Iraq’s weapons debate extends far beyond technicaldiscussions about security arrangements. It has become a political andconstitutional test of the state established after 2003.
Efforts toinclude the Kurdistan Region’s forces in disarmament discussions may appear, onthe surface, to be attempts to distribute pressure more evenly or createnegotiating balance. Yet such efforts collide with a fundamental distinctionbetween a regional force grounded in constitutional authority and historicalexperience, and armed formations whose relationship with the state remainscontested.
As Baghdadseeks to reinforce centralized security decision-making under both domestic andinternational pressure, Erbil regards any challenge to the Peshmerga as achallenge to the foundations of federal partnership itself.
In that sense,many observers believe that any approach failing to recognize this distinctionmay not advance the goal of regulating weapons. Instead, it could open the doorto a new constitutional confrontation between Baghdad and the KurdistanRegion—an outcome few actors appear willing to risk.
*In TwelverShiite doctrine, Imam Al-Mahdi is the hidden twelfth Imam who is believed toremain in occultation until his return at the end of times. His reappearance isexpected to usher in an era of justice and righteousness after a period ofturmoil and oppression.
Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.
