(Hatha Al-Youm)– The Syrian map is undergoing its most dangerous structural transformation since the conflict began, as the last 48 hours have marked the effective end of the "Autonomous Administration" project in North and East Syria.
High-ranking intelligence sources state that the events unfolding in the cities of Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Tabqa represent the literal execution of what was known within inner circles as "Plan B"—a strategy formulated by Ahmed al-Sharaa years ago, aimed at restoring absolute centralization by dismantling non-governmental armed components after their functional utility against the former regime was exhausted.
A Wolf in Revolutionary Clothing
Al-Sharaa, formerly known as al-Jolani, never abandoned his centralist ambitions, even when leading his factions from the last besieged pocket in Idlib.
Intelligence reports indicate that "Plan B" relied on the principle of "strategic dormancy," where al-Sharaa demonstrated extraordinary tactical flexibility toward the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) during the battles to topple Damascus.
This was a calculated move to ensure the neutralization of thousands of Kurdish fighters and prevent them from intervening in favor of Bashar al-Assad.
Once power stabilized in Damascus and gained regional recognition, "Plan B" moved from paper to the field.
Al-Sharaa had harbored intentions to attack the Kurds since he was fighting in the countryside of Hama and Idlib, but he waited for three conditions to be met: international air cover, an intelligence consensus with Ankara, and the lifting of U.S. protection from the SDF.
Al-Sharaa succeeded in "sedating" the Kurdish leadership with fragile cultural and administrative promises, while operations rooms in Damascus were already drawing maps for deployment in the oil and gas fields.
The End of the Proxy Era
In the midst of this transformation, the name Thomas Barrack emerges—the U.S. Special Envoy whom observers regard as the most dangerous figure in shaping the region’s future.
Barrack differs radically from his predecessor, Brett McGurk; while McGurk leaned toward protecting "local partners" and maintaining a balance of components, Barrack adopts a "Grip Centralization" (Centrist Grip) mentality.
Barrack believes that the stability of U.S. interests in the Middle East requires dealing with a "strong central state" in Damascus capable of securing borders and protecting resources, rather than with "sub-administrations" that provoke regional allies like Turkey.
Diplomatic sources confirm that Brack, in coordination with Admiral Brad Cooper, spearheaded massive pressure on SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi.
These pressures involved giving the Kurdish leadership a choice: either full and unconditional integration into Syrian state institutions or facing a military invasion backed by regional cover. Barrack was the real architect of the "handover" process that took place in the Al-Omar and Conoco fields, considering that the era of "investing in proxies" has given way to the era of "dealing with states."
The "PKK" Complex and Functional Dependency
One of the primary reasons for the Kurdish failure to hold their territories lies in their remaining under the "umbrella of the Kurdistan Workers' Party" (PKK).
Analysts argue that this connection was not merely an ideological burden but a golden pretext used by Ahmed al-Sharaa to legitimize his moves internationally and regionally.
Al-Sharaa exploited the Turkish veto against any armed Kurdish entity to present himself to Ankara as a "security alternative" capable of uprooting the influence of PKK fighters from northern Syria.
Analysis indicates that the Kurdish leadership failed to realize that "U.S. protection" was tied to a specific function: fighting ISIS.
Once this mission ended and a strong government rose in Damascus—one ready to cooperate with Washington even more robustly than the Kurds themselves—the SDF lost its justification for independent existence.
The Kurds' lack of written and binding guarantees from the U.S. administration left them vulnerable to political fluctuations; Kurdish history is littered with oral promises that evaporate at the first settlement between great powers and central regimes.
The Losing Bet and Lessons from Kirkuk 2017
The scene of falling territories east of the Euphrates recalls the 2017 scenario in Iraq, where the Kurds lost half their territory following the independence referendum.
In both cases, there was an "over-reliance" on support from Washington and signals from Tel Aviv.
As writer Omar al-Shaher explains, the United States uses the Kurdish card as a seasonal balancing tool; in Iraq, the need for the Kurds was to balance the Shiite majority, while in Syria, the new "Sunni Syria" led by al-Sharaa represents a sufficient balancer for Washington, making the abandonment of the Kurds an easy strategic decision.
The loss of control over oil and gas fields (such as Rumailan and Al-Omar) signifies the collapse of the economic pillar for any Kurdish political ambition.
Al-Sharaa realized that controlling "Bread and Oil" is the shortest path to imposing centralization—a strategy he applied brilliantly by cutting supply lines and administratively besieging regions before entering them militarily.
The Search for a Reliable Ally
Facts have proven that reliance on transnational allies (such as the United States) without local strategic depth is political suicide.
Analysts believe that a natural and reliable ally for the Kurds must emerge from within the region's geopolitical fabric.
Kurdish journalist Mahmoud Yassin notes that "Arab Shiites" in Iraq and Syria are a potential strategic partner, sharing with the Kurds the anxieties of "exclusionary centralization" and a history of shared grievances.
Others argue that building a solid Kurdish-Shiite alliance based on a balance of interests and recognition of constitutional rights is the only remaining bulwark to prevent the "al-Sharaa model" from being repeated elsewhere.
The warning here is directed at the Iraqi domestic scene; the success Ahmed al-Sharaa achieved in circumventing the Kurds and dismantling their power might tempt a future "Sunni ruler" in Baghdad to repeat the same scenario by pouncing on the constitutional gains of the Kurdistan Region under slogans of "imposing sovereignty" and "prestige of the center," exploiting any shift in the international mood or a regional cover similar to what happened in Damascus.
Yassin reiterates this point, stating on his Facebook page: "The Arab Sunnis living in the Kurdistan Region are happy with what happened [to the Kurds] in Syria."
The End of the Minor "Game of Nations"
What occurred in the last 48 hours was not just a military failure, but a failure to read the major shifts in the mindset of decision-makers in Washington and Damascus. Al-Sharaa executed "Plan B" using Thomas Barrack as a bridge toward restoring central sovereignty.
Today, the Kurds are left with a single choice: a strategic repositioning to find permanent "geographical" allies, far from the illusion of U.S. protection, which the Syrian experience has proven always ends in a back-breaking "crash landing."
