Shafaq NewsThe rapid escalation of regional tensions —driven byinternal unrest in Iran, mounting international pressure on Tehran, and renewedwarnings from Washington— has placed Iraq’s armed factions before one of theirmost sensitive tests since the defeat of ISIS. What is unfolding is not adebate over ideology, but a recalibration of strategy, as these groups attemptto reconcile long-standing ties with Iran with the political, legal, andeconomic realities of the Iraqi state.At stake is more than regional alignment. The currentmoment forces armed factions in Iraq to reassess how far their externalcommitments can extend without undermining their domestic standing, exposingthe country to international penalties, or accelerating efforts to dismantletheir military power outside state control.Iran has faced weeks of heightened internal tensionmarked by protests, security crackdowns, and intensified rhetoric from Westerncapitals. The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) documenteddemonstrations at nearly 300 locations across 111 cities in all 31 provinces,reporting at least 50 deaths, including police officers, and over 2,200arrests, though exact figures remain contested due to restrictions onindependent verification. Iranian authorities have also announced the arrest ofindividuals accused of espionage, including one suspect described as linked toIsrael’s Mossad, claims that further raised regional alarm without independentconfirmation.: Iran’s protests between economic crisis and political contestationFor Iraq’s armed factions, these developments matternot because they demand immediate action, but because they raise the cost ofassociation. Any perception that Iraqi groups are intervening beyond theirborders —or assisting Tehran in internal matters— risks transforming Iraq froma fragile stabilizer into an extension of regional confrontation.Iraq’s armed factions are neither purely non-statemilitias nor fully subordinated government forces. Most emerged after 2003 andexpanded dramatically following the 2014 ISIS onslaught, later becomingformally linked to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). While the PMF islegally recognized and funded by the state, many constituent factions retainindependent command structures, political wings, and economic networks.This dual identity, simultaneously inside and outsidethe state, explains why regional crises quickly turn into domestic politicaldilemmas. Decisions taken beyond Iraq’s borders reverberate directly throughBaghdad’s institutions.Political researcher Ramadan al-Badran describes thecurrent phase as “embarrassing and complex” for armed factions, arguing thatIran’s pressures and Washington’s demands have converged into a “moment ofexistential decision.” Some groups, he notes, are increasingly inclined towardprioritizing Iraqi state interests and avoiding escalation, while othershesitate, less for ideological reasons than for fear of losing entrenchedpolitical and economic influence should weapons be relinquished.The question is no longer theoretical: can armedinfluence survive without arms?From within the factions themselves, the dominantpublic message emphasizes sovereignty and restraint. Hussein al-Sheihani, asenior figure in Sadiqoon, the political wing of Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, led by Qaisal-Khazaali, stresses that armed groups operate under “clear constants,”foremost among them adherence to Iraq’s religious authority and alignment withstate decisions on war and peace.By rejecting comparisons with Yemen and insisting onIraq’s “specificity,” factions signal that they seek to avoid transforming thecountry into a battlefield for proxy wars. Yet Sheihani also draws clear redlines, warning that any direct attack on Iraq would trigger a response framedas both a national and religious duty.A similar balancing act appears in the remarks of Hadial-Saadi of Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, who argues that Iran remains capable of managingits internal unrest and deterring external threats without Iraqi involvement.While affirming ideological and strategic ties with Tehran, al-Saadi insiststhat Iraqi factions have not historically functioned as “an automatic extensionof Iran’s deterrence apparatus unless Iraqi security itself was at stake.”This position seeks to reassure two audiences at once:allies within the so-called Axis of Resistance and Iraqi political actors waryof external entanglement. It is a narrative of deterrence without deployment.: Iraq’s armed factions and the disarmament debate: Why unity masks deep divisionsThese carefully calibrated messages come amidaccusations by the US State Department that Iran has relied on “Iraqi andLebanese militias” to suppress protests. Regime opposition-linked outlets havealleged cross-border recruitment and movement under religious cover. NeitherBaghdad nor Tehran has confirmed these claims, and Iraqi faction leaders haveissued implicit denials.The veracity of these reports matters less than theirpolitical impact. Even unproven allegations intensify US pressure on Baghdad,strengthen arguments for disarmament, and deepen domestic suspicion towardarmed groups.International pressure on Iraq has increasinglyfocused on controlling weapons outside state authority. Here, armed factionsare far from unified. Some groups and political actors, including Asaib AhlAl-Haq, have signaled openness to negotiations, gradual integration, orredefinition of military roles under state oversight.Others reject the premise outright. Hardline factionssuch as Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba have repeatedly opposeddisarmament initiatives, framing them as externally imposed and strategicallydangerous. This split underscores that “the factions” are not a monolith, but aspectrum of interests responding differently to the same pressures.On the regional level, escalation rhetoric is voicedmost clearly by actors operating outside state frameworks. Abdulghanial-Zubaidi, a military figure in Yemen’s Ansarallah (Houthis), tells Shafaq Newsthat the region has entered what he called a “semi-ignited phase,” warning thatany direct intervention against Iran or the wider Axis of Resistance wouldtrigger forceful responses with repercussions extending beyond the Middle East.Iraq’s armed factions, however, have been careful notto adopt this language publicly. Unlike Yemen, Iraq functions within arecognized state structure that includes an elected parliament, aninternationally engaged government, and an oil-dependent economy deeply exposedto global markets. Armed groups are embedded in this system through politics,budgets, and local economies, making overt regional intervention far costlierthan rhetorical solidarity.This structural difference explains the emphasis onrestraint and “Iraqi specificity.” For factions operating inside Iraq’sinstitutions, Yemen-style escalation would risk sanctions exposure, domesticbacklash, and a direct challenge to state legitimacy, outcomes that couldaccelerate external pressure to curtail or dismantle armed power rather thanpreserve it.Three scenarios now dominate political calculations.The first —and most likely in the short term— is controlled alignment, wherefactions double down on sovereignty language, avoid cross-border action, andtolerate limited state oversight. The second is internal fragmentation, aspragmatic factions move closer to Baghdad while hardliners resist, producingdivergent strategies under a shared umbrella. The third, least predictable butmost dangerous, is escalation triggered by a major regional shock that collapsesexisting restraints.Caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani haswarned that Israel previously sought to drag Iraq into war after October 7,2023, underscoring Baghdad’s determination to avoid repetition. Washington,however, continues to press for tangible steps to curb armed influence, linkingIraq’s political future to its ability to enforce state monopoly over force.Ultimately, Iraq’s armed factions are no longerdebating loyalty; they are negotiating survival within a tightening corridor ofregional pressure and domestic expectation. Their challenge is to preserveinfluence without becoming the catalyst for isolation or conflict. How longthat balance can hold will shape Iraq’s stability, and the wider region’sfragile equilibrium.Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.