Shafaq News
Syria entered anew political era following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's government in2024; few communities faced a more consequential moment than the country'sKurds. Concentrated largely in the north and northeast, Syrian Kurds spentdecades seeking citizenship, cultural recognition and political representation. The 2011 civil war transformed them into one of Syria's most influentialmilitary and political actors. Today, Kurdish leaders are working to preservegains achieved during long-time conflict while defining their place in Syria'sfuture.
Most estimatesplace Syria's Kurdish population at between two and three million people beforethe civil war, representing roughly 10 to 15% of the country's population. Thelargest Kurdish communities are concentrated in three historically importantregions: al-Jazira in the northeast, Kobani (also known as Ain al-Arab) alongthe Turkish border and Afrin in the northwest. Significant Kurdish populationshave also long lived in Aleppo and Damascus.
Unlike theKurds of Iraq, who have enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy for decades, SyrianKurds spent much of the modern era on the margins of political life. WhileKurdish identity remained strong through language, tribal networks and culturaltraditions, successive governments viewed expressions of Kurdish nationalismwith suspicion.
Syrian Kurdishpolitics has long been shaped by tribal, ideological and regional divisions. Some movements developed close ties with Iraqi Kurdish parties, particularlythe Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by the Barzani family. Others wereinfluenced by the ideas of Abdullah Öcalan, founder of the Kurdistan Workers'Party (PKK), whose writings on decentralization and local governance latershaped institutions in northeastern Syria.
Theseinfluences became increasingly important after 2011, when the collapse of stateauthority across large parts of Syria created opportunities few Syrian Kurdshad previously imagined. Within a few years, Kurdish-led forces controlled vastterritories, administered millions of residents and became key partners in theinternational campaign against ISIS.
Decades ofMarginalization
The modernKurdish political experience in Syria was defined by exclusion, culturalrestrictions, and unresolved questions of citizenship.
The mostconsequential episode occurred in 1962, when Damascus conducted a specialcensus in al-Hasakah province. Approximately 120,000 Kurds were stripped ofSyrian citizenship after being classified as foreigners. Because citizenship statuswas inherited, the number of stateless Kurds and their descendants grewsteadily over the following decades, reaching roughly 300,000 by the eve of the2011 uprising.
Stateless Kurdsfaced restrictions on employment, education, property ownership, marriageregistration and freedom of movement. For generations of Kurdish families,citizenship became one of the defining political issues in their relationshipwith the Syrian state.
Historian JordiTejel, author of Syria's Kurds: "History, Politics and Society,"described statelessness as "one of the most powerful symbols of Kurdishexclusion in Syria." The issue became a central rallying point for Kurdishpolitical movements and remained unresolved for nearly half a century.
Citizenship wasonly one aspect of a broader framework that many Kurds viewed as an effort toweaken their identity. Kurdish-language education was largely absent frompublic schools, political activism was closely monitored, and Arabizationpolicies in parts of the northeast deepened tensions between Kurdishcommunities and the state.
Despite thesepressures, Kurdish political movements remained active. Several parties emergedduring the second half of the twentieth century, though many operated undersignificant constraints. Their demands generally focused on cultural rights,citizenship, and political recognition rather than outright independence.
The mostsignificant pre-war challenge to state authority came in March 2004. What beganas clashes during a football match in Qamishli escalated into widespread unrestacross Kurdish areas. Security forces responded forcefully, resulting in,according to Human Rights Watch, at least 30 to 40 deaths, dozens of arrests,and thousands of demonstrations that spread beyond the city.
The Qamishliunrest is widely regarded as the most significant Kurdish protest movement inSyria before the civil war. For many, it demonstrated both the depth of Kurdishgrievances and the limits of reform under the existing system. ResearcherHarriet Allsopp has argued that the unrest exposed frustrations that hadaccumulated over decades and foreshadowed many of the demands that lateremerged during the Syrian uprising.
When protestserupted across Syria in 2011, Kurdish communities entered the crisis with adistinct historical experience. Their concerns overlapped with those of otherSyrians seeking political change, while also reflecting long-standing,unresolved grievances that had accumulated over decades.
Chaos BreedsPower
The collapse ofstate authority across large parts of northern and northeastern Syria createdopportunities that previous generations of Syrian Kurds had rarely imagined.
In 2012,government troops withdrew from many Kurdish-majority towns and cities, includingKobani, Amuda, Derik and large parts of al-Hasakah province. The mainbeneficiary was the Democratic Union Party (PYD), founded in 2003, whichrapidly expanded its influence through local councils, civil institutions, andsecurity structures.
The rise ofISIS accelerated this transformation. Beginning in 2013, the group seized vastterritory across Syria and Iraq, placing Kurdish-controlled areas on the frontlines of one of the region's most consequential conflicts.
No battleproved more significant than Kobani. In September 2014, ISIS launched a majoroffensive against the city, and many expected it to fall. Kurdish fighters,backed by US-led Coalition airstrikes, mounted a determined defense thatultimately forced ISIS to retreat.
Beyond itsmilitary importance, Kobani transformed the international profile of SyrianKurdish forces. Images of Kurdish fighters resisting ISIS spread worldwide,turning the city into a symbol of resistance against extremism and elevatingKurdish forces into key partners in the campaign against ISIS.
As cooperationwith Washington expanded, Kurdish-led forces helped establish the SyrianDemocratic Forces (SDF) in October 2015. The Kurdish-majority coalition broughttogether Arab, Syriac-Assyrian and other local forces, enabling operationsacross a broader area while reducing perceptions that the fight against ISISwas exclusively Kurdish.
Backed by theUS, the SDF spearheaded major offensives against ISIS strongholds, includingManbij in 2016 and Raqqa in 2017, the group's de facto capital in Syria. FormerUS Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Brett McGurk describedthe SDF as an "indispensable partner" in the campaign, whichculminated in March 2019 with the fall of Baghouz, ISIS's last territorialenclave in Syria.
The victorycame at a high cost. More than 11,000 SDF fighters were killed andapproximately 24,000 wounded during the campaign. According to the UN HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), more than 190,000 people were displaced inand around Raqqa between April and July 2017, while large sections of Kobaniand other frontline communities were left heavily damaged.
Building theAutonomous Administration
Militaryvictories against ISIS transformed the balance of power in northeastern Syria, butthe more enduring development was political. As Kurdish-led forces expandedtheir control, they faced a challenge few Kurdish movements in the Middle Easthad previously encountered: governing a territory inhabited by millions ofpeople from diverse ethnic, religious and tribal backgrounds.
The result wasthe gradual emergence of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria(AANES). Known to many supporters as Rojava, it evolved from local councilsfocused on public services, aid distribution and security into a broaderadministrative framework responsible for education, municipal affairs, economicmanagement, and internal security.
At its greatestterritorial extent, the Administration governed roughly one-third of Syria, anestimated four to five million residents. The territory also included many ofthe country's most important agricultural regions and oil-producing areas. Arabs, Syriac-Assyrians, Armenians, Turkmens, and other communities livedalongside Kurds, making diversity a defining feature of governance.
TheAdministration's political philosophy drew heavily on the ideas of AbdullahÖcalan, founder of the PKK. His concept of democratic confederalism emphasizeddecentralization, local participation, and community-based governance rather thana traditional nation-state.
Supportersviewed the model as an alternative to the highly centralized structures thathad long dominated Syria. Critics, however, argued that power remainedconcentrated within a single political movement. Former Syrian Foreign MinisterFaisal Mekdad, for example, dismissed the Kurdish-led project as "aseparatist project that has no future," questioning whether it trulyreflected the region's political diversity.
One of theAdministration's most distinctive features has been its emphasis on women'sparticipation. Leadership positions generally operate through a co-chair systemin which a man and a woman jointly hold authority, a model replicated acrosscouncils, political institutions and civil organizations. Among the Administration'smost prominent female figures was Ilham Ahmed, who emerged as a leadingdiplomatic representative and became one of the best-known Kurdish politicalfigures on the international stage.
Women alsoassumed prominent military roles through the Women's Protection Units (YPJ),which gained international attention during the fight against ISIS and becameone of the most recognizable symbols of Kurdish resistance.
Education,meanwhile, became another major area of change. For decades, Kurdish-languageinstruction had been largely absent from Syria's public schools. Under AANES,Kurdish-language curricula were introduced in many schools alongside efforts toexpand teaching of Kurdish history, literature, and culture.
Maintainingsecurity across a vast and conflict-affected territory became another centralresponsibility of the Administration. To that end, it established the Asayish,an internal security force responsible for policing, public order, andcounterterrorism operations. Together with the SDF, it became a central pillarof governance.
TheAdministration also faced persistent political disputes from within the Kurdishpolitical arena. Although the PYD emerged as the dominant force, it neverenjoyed unanimous support among Syria's Kurds. The Kurdish National Council(ENKS) repeatedly accused it of monopolizing political life and restrictingopposition activity.
These disputesreflected a broader reality often overlooked by outside observers: Syrian Kurdsare not politically unified. Differences over ideology, relations with regionalpowers and the future of self-government continue to shape politics acrossnortheastern Syria.
Four-WayCrossfire
The future ofSyria's Kurds cannot be understood through domestic politics alone. Geographyhas placed them within one of the Middle East's most complex geopoliticalenvironments, where decisions made in Damascus, Ankara, Erbil, and Washingtonoften carry as much weight as those made in Qamishli or Raqqa.
Since theemergence of AANES, Syrian Kurds have balanced relationships with regional andinternational actors whose interests frequently overlap, compete or directlyconflict. Among these relationships, none has been more important than thatwith Damascus.
Despite yearsof conflict, Kurdish authorities and the Syrian state never existed in completeseparation. Government institutions continued operating in parts of Qamishliand Hasakah, while state employees continued receiving salaries from Damascus,maintaining a limited presence in Rojava.
Late PYDco-chair Salih Muslim, whose party remains the dominant force within AANES,consistently maintained that the Kurds were not seeking independence. Instead,they advocated a decentralized political system that would preserve Syria'sterritorial integrity while granting substantial authority to localadministrations.
Damascus,meanwhile, has traditionally taken a different view. Successive governmentsfavored centralized authority, arguing that military and administrativeinstitutions should ultimately operate under state control.
If relationswith Damascus are defined by constitutional and political questions, relationswith Turkiye are shaped primarily by security concerns. Ankara maintains thatthe PYD and YPG have close ties to the PKK, an organization designated as aterrorist group by Turkiye, US and the European Union, and therefore representa ‘’national security threat.’’ This perception has guided Ankara's policythroughout the conflict.
Beginning in2016, Turkiye launched a series of military operations aimed at preventingKurdish-controlled territories from forming a continuous zone along itssouthern border. Operation Euphrates Shield disrupted Kurdish territorialcontinuity west of the Euphrates River. Operation Olive Branch in 2018 resultedin the capture of Afrin, while Operation Peace Spring in 2019 led to furtherterritorial changes around Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn.
TurkishPresident Recep Tayyip Erdogan described these operations as "necessaryborder security measures," while Syrian Kurds viewed them as efforts toprevent the consolidation of Kurdish self-rule and weaken institutions thatemerged during the war.
Therelationship between Syrian Kurds and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has alsoshaped political dynamics. The strongest ties have historically existed betweenthe Kurdish National Council (ENKS) and the KDP, one of the dominant politicalforces in the Region.
KDP PresidentMasoud Barzani repeatedly encouraged dialogue among Syrian Kurdish factions,with Erbil serving as a venue for repeated reconciliation efforts between thePYD and ENKS. That role has continued under current President NechirvanBarzani, who has consistently advocated dialogue and political compromise.
Thisrelationship extends beyond politics. Thousands of Syrian Kurds maintainfamily, educational and commercial ties with the Kurdistan Region, which hasserved at various times as a refuge for displaced Syrians, and an economic outletfor northeastern Syria.
Yet no externalpartnership has shaped Syrian Kurdish fortunes more than the relationship withthe United States. The alliance took shape during the campaign against ISIS,enabling the SDF to expand operations, defeat the group, and emerge as one ofthe country’s most powerful military actors.
Thepartnership, however, has always been accompanied by uncertainty. Kurdishleaders remain aware that foreign military deployments are rarely permanent,and that lasting security ultimately depends on a political settlement withinSyria itself.
Fragile NewDawn
The collapse ofBashar al-Assad's government in 2024 opened a new chapter in the history ofSyria’s Kurds. Soon after assuming power, transitional Syrian President Ahmadal-Sharaa called for all armed formations operating outside state institutionsto be integrated into a unified national army.
Damascus alsosought to restore state authority across territories administered by AANES.
Kurdish leadersdid not reject integration outright but pushed for guarantees on politicalrepresentation, local administration, and the future of institutions builtduring more than a decade of conflict. A breakthrough appeared to come in March2025, when al-Sharaa and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi signed an agreementestablishing a framework for integrating northeastern Syria into the Syrianstate.
The agreementrecognized the Kurdish community as an integral component of Syria andaddressed issues ranging from citizenship rights and border crossings toairports and energy infrastructure. “Our vision of Syria is a decentralized,secular and civil country based on democracy that preserves the rights of allof its components,” Abdi stated during the signing ceremony, describing thedeal as “a real opportunity to build a new Syria.”
Backed bystrong US engagement, the framework was widely viewed as the most significantunderstanding reached between Damascus and Kurdish authorities. Yetimplementation soon stalled as disputes emerged over timelines, mechanisms, andcompeting interpretations of the text, producing what both sides described as a“crisis of confidence.”
The tensionswere reflected on the ground. Clashes involving government-backed forces andthe SDF erupted in Aleppo, al-Hasakah, Qamishli, and Kobani. According to localauthorities, at least 24 people were killed and around 129 wounded. SDF-affiliated media reported dozens of civilian deaths in Sheikh Maqsoud andAshrafieh, along with the displacement of more than 165,000 people.
Efforts to revivethe diplomatic route led to a ceasefire agreement on January 20, 2026. Underthe framework, Damascus and the SDF committed to further talks on unresolvedissues, including the future of Kurdish-run civilian and security institutions,following SDF withdrawals from areas it had previously controlled.
US SpecialEnvoy for Syria Tom Barrack described the moment as “the greatest opportunity”for Syria’s Kurds to secure citizenship rights, cultural protections, andpolitical participation within a unified Syrian state.
Implementationaccelerated in the months that followed. Syrian security forces were deployedto the centers of al-Hasakah and Qamishli, replacing SDF personnel, whileinstitutions affiliated with the Autonomous Administration were integrated intostate bodies. The framework retained civilian employees, addressed Kurdishcivil and educational rights, and included provisions facilitating the returnof displaced residents.
Underal-Sharaa, the Kurdish component has obtained 11 seats in the new SyrianPeople’s Assembly (the 2026 transitional parliament), out of a total of 210seats, representing 4.07% of the legislature, according to electoral data andofficial results.
The limitedrepresentation has sparked widespread debate and sharp criticism from Kurdishpolitical actors, who argue that the figure does not reflect their demographicweight in Syria.
Of the 11 seatswon by Kurdish representatives, nine were secured through electoral processesinvolving local “electoral bodies” in northern and eastern Syria, includingdistricts in al-Hasakah, Qamishli, and Kobani. The remaining two seats werepart of the 70-member group appointed directly by al-Sharaa. The appointeesinclude Abdul Hakim Bashar, a leading figure in the Kurdish National Council(ENKS), and Mustafa Abdi, bringing limited Kurdish representation within thepresidential quota.
Whether the newprocess ultimately produces a lasting settlement remains uncertain. What isalready clear, however, is that Syria’s Kurds have moved from the politicalmargins to the center of negotiations shaping the country’s future.
Written andedited by Shafaq News Agency staff.